Reconstructing Iraq’s Budgetary Institutions: Coalition State Building after Saddam Dec 01, 2013 By James Savage Reconstructing Iraq’s Budgetary Institutions: Coalition State Building after Saddam Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press James Savage James D. Savage is a professor of politics and public policy at the Batten School and a Fellow of the National Academy of Public Administration. His research and teaching focus on comparative budgetary, fiscal, and macroeconomic policy, with an emphasis on the United States, the European Union, Iraq and Japan. He is particularly interested in the development of macrobudgetary rules, procedures, and institutions in these countries, and how they influence fiscal outcomes. Read full bio Related Content James Savage Strengthening the European Commission’s Budgetary and Economic Surveillance Capacity Since Greece and the Euro Crisis: A Study of Five Directorates-General Research The Administrative Costs of Congressional Earmarking: The Case of the Office of Naval Research Research Discussions about congressional earmarking often focus on their direct costs in the federal government’s appropriations bills. This article shows that this conventional view neglects the administrative costs of earmarking by examining the extensive transaction and opportunity costs that come with the political, budgetary, and programmatic management of these earmarked projects in Congress and in the Office of Naval Research.
James Savage James D. Savage is a professor of politics and public policy at the Batten School and a Fellow of the National Academy of Public Administration. His research and teaching focus on comparative budgetary, fiscal, and macroeconomic policy, with an emphasis on the United States, the European Union, Iraq and Japan. He is particularly interested in the development of macrobudgetary rules, procedures, and institutions in these countries, and how they influence fiscal outcomes. Read full bio
Strengthening the European Commission’s Budgetary and Economic Surveillance Capacity Since Greece and the Euro Crisis: A Study of Five Directorates-General Research
The Administrative Costs of Congressional Earmarking: The Case of the Office of Naval Research Research Discussions about congressional earmarking often focus on their direct costs in the federal government’s appropriations bills. This article shows that this conventional view neglects the administrative costs of earmarking by examining the extensive transaction and opportunity costs that come with the political, budgetary, and programmatic management of these earmarked projects in Congress and in the Office of Naval Research.